O impacto do ativismo judicial na alocação de recursos públicos para a saúde e seus efeitos sobre a separação de poderes

Abstract

This article analyzes the phenomenon of judicial activism in Brazil, focusing on public health in light of the judiciary's growing intervention in budgetary issues, which raises concerns about the separation of powers and legislative autonomy under the 1988 Federal Constitution (CRFB/1988). The main objective is to investigate how judicial activism impacts the allocation of public resources for health and how this affects the separation of powers in Brazil, considering the constitutional limits and the institutional role of each branch. The study uses a deductive approach, analyzing judicial decisions and their budgetary consequences, in addition to a bibliographic review of scientific publications from the last decade, based on the hypothesis that judicial activism can compromise the autonomy of the Legislative and Executive branches by invading their traditional powers and altering the institutional balance. The results indicate that this judicial intervention can create an imbalance in the separation of powers, requiring a reexamination of the functions of the Judiciary to ensure both the protection of fundamental rights and respect for legislative autonomy and the effectiveness of public health policies. In this scenario, parameters of institutional deference, proportionality criteria, and reservation of the possible are also examined, seeking to delimit when judicial decisions, although aimed at enforcing the right to health, spill over into distributive choices typical of public policy formulation and budget planning at the federal and municipal levels.